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I.

INTRODUCTION

The debate regarding international harmonization of a grace
1
period in international patent law is not new. The recent change
2
from first-to-invent to first-to-file in the United States under the
3
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) offers a renewed
opportunity to call for the adoption of a novelty grace period as an
international best practice—specifically in Europe.
A novelty grace period allows an invention to become publicly
known prior to the invention’s application filing date, where that
4
disclosure otherwise would bar the invention’s patentability.
1. See Joseph Straus, Grace Period and the European and International Patent
Law: Analysis of Key Legal and Socio-Economic Aspects, in 20 STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW (Gerhard Schricker ed., 2001) (describing the
debate of a European grace period as far back as 1968); Margo A. Bagley, The Need
for Speed (and Grace): Issues in a First-Inventor-to-File World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1035 (2008); Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the
International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 543
(1988).
2. First-to-file is referred to as first-inventor-to-file in the America Invents
Act and in common usage in the United States. For simplicity, this note will refer
to first-to-file when referring both to first-inventor-to-file in the United States and
first-to-file in the rest of the world.
3. The first-to-file provision took effect March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011).
4. 2 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 8:199 (4th ed. 2012). A
more in depth description is provided by Emmanuel Roucounas:
The term . . . grace period . . . is understood as a period of time (six or
twelve months) preceding the filing of a patent application, during which
disclosures by any means (in writing, orally, by use, on exhibitions, etc.)
of the invention for which the patent application is filed by the inventor
or his/her successor in title do not constitute prior art in respect of the
patent application at hand.
In principle, such ‘non-prejudicial’
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United States patent law operates with a one-year grace period,
whereas the patent offices under the European Patent Convention
6
require absolute novelty. In patent systems with absolute novelty,
any disclosure making the invention publicly known prior to filing
a patent application will preclude the inventor from obtaining a
7
patent on that invention.
Introducing a grace period under the European Patent
Convention as a limited safety net against disclosures by
unsophisticated applicants will protect the ability of applicants to
meet university research publication requirements or evaluate the
commercial potential of an invention before committing resources
8
to patenting.
The grace-period concept is a controversial feature of the
patent system to some because it abrogates the fundamental notion
that a powerful monopoly should only be granted to inventions not
9
previously disclosed to the public. That is, “[i]nventors are never
entitled to take from the public subject matter that deemed [sic]
already known or merely obvious from what is deemed to be
10
known.”
Absolute novelty is practical to administer by patent
disclosures do not establish a priority date, i.e. do not provide for
immunity for the inventor/applicant against parallel or later independent
disclosures, including patent applications of third parties. Immunity is
granted to the inventor himself against inconsiderate or rash publication. In
spite of previous disclosure of the invention by the applicant or his/her
predecessor in title, novelty is not destroyed. An invention is novel when
it does not form part of the state of the art.
Emmanuel Roucounas, The Debate Regarding the Grace Period in International Patent
Law: A Reminder, in ALLEA BIENNIAL Y.B. 2006 31, 31 (Jüri Engelbrecht & Johannes
J.F. Schroots eds. 2007) (footnote omitted).
5. Roucounas, supra note 4, at 31–33.
6. See, e.g., id. at 37.
7. Straus, supra note 1, at v. Article 55 of the European Patent Convention
does allow for two types of nonprejudicial disclosures that will not destroy an
invention’s novelty—evident abuse and exhibition at an internationally recognized
exhibition. See infra Part III.B.1.
8. See infra Parts V.A–B.
9. See ROBERT A. ARMITAGE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR “PRIOR ART”
DISTINCTIONS
AMONG
PATENT
SYSTEMS:
INSIGHTS
INTO
A
BALANCED,
HARMONIZED
PATENT
SYSTEM
1
(2003),
available
at
http://www2.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Meetings_and_Events1
/International_Symposia1/ArmitagePaper.pdf; JAN E.M. GALAMA, EXPERT
OPINION ON THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST THE INTRODUCTION OF A GRACE
PERIOD
IN
EUROPEAN
PATENT
LAW
13
(2000),
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20000817072657/http://www.epo.co.at/news
/headlns/pdf/galama.pdf.
10. ARMITAGE, supra note 9, at 1.
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offices because the filing date of the application may not be
11
preceded by any disclosure of the invention’s subject matter.
Absolute novelty, however, is a rigid concept apart from the reality
of modern research, capital, and inventors’ knowledge of the
12
patent system.
The major patent offices in the United States, Japan, and
Korea recognize the need to balance the strict nature of the novelty
requirement with the demands of a healthy patent system, to make
13
it accessible to all users by allowing prefiling disclosures.
The
14
European Patent Convention —and thereby the European Patent
Office—however, lacks a mechanism to protect unsophisticated
applicants, who disclose the invention by need or mistake, prior to
filing a patent application or entering into a nondisclosure
15
agreement.
The disproportionate result is the complete
16
destruction of novelty, and a loss of all rights by the inventor.
17
While international harmonization of substantive patent law
has so far been pursued through grand-bargain treaty negotiations,
this note argues that international harmonization is adequately
achieved by incremental adoption of best practices by each
national or regional patent office.
The United States’ adoption of first-to-file is the leading
example of a unilateral adoption of international best practices.
The switch to first-to-file simplified United States patent law for
both domestic and foreign applicants. While retaining a grace
period similar to that in Japan and Korea, the switch at the same
time necessarily removed features of the first-to-invent system
11. GALAMA, supra note 9, at 13.
12. See MOY, supra note 4, § 8:213; Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent
Laws, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 591, 609–10 (1994).
13. See infra Parts III.A–B.
14. The European Patent Convention (EPC) is a multilateral treaty initially
signed in 1973, under which the European Patent Office operates. History, EUR.
PAT. OFF., http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/history.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2013). The treaty instituted a patent grant procedure, in which a patent granted
by the EPO when validated in a member country has the effect of a patent under
national patent law in that country. Convention on the Grant of European
Patents, art. 2(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter European Patent
Convention] (amended Nov. 29, 2000).
15. See European Patent Convention, supra note 14, art. 55; Straus, supra note
1, at xi; Roucounas, supra note 4, at 34.
16. MOY, supra note 4, § 8:213.
17. Substantive (patent) law is “the law that creates, defines, and regulates
the rights, duties, and powers of parties,” as opposed to procedural law. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1567 (9th ed. 2009).
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benefitting larger companies and other sophisticated applicants.
A limited safety-net grace period protecting against an
inventor’s own otherwise novelty-destroying disclosures is a best
practice. Yet, until recently, only the concept of a broad general
19
grace period has been negotiated internationally. The general
grace period is incompatible with first-to-file patent systems and
rightfully failed to be adopted under the European Patent
20
Convention.
The safety-net grace period instead ensures the
participation of unsophisticated applicants and upholds the
bargain that all inventors will receive a patent as a reward for their
disclosure, where the subject matter is not already known.
This note will first compare and distinguish the features of the
21
safety-net grace period to the concept of the general grace period.
The note will then review grace periods as they exist in the United
States, the other four major patent offices, and sixty-seven other
22
countries worldwide. Next, it evaluates the arguments asserted
23
against grace periods and analyzes how the absence of a grace
period impacts European university researchers, small and middle24
sized enterprises, and the general public. This analysis shows that
a safety-net grace period would be beneficial to the users of the
European patent system and that a suggested model safety-net
grace period can be implemented through multilateral
25
negotiations between the major patent offices. Finally, this note
concludes that the member countries must act without delay to
26
amend Article 55 of the European Patent Convention.

18. See 157 CONG. REC. S1089–90 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Patrick Leahy) (“[The interference] process is lengthy, complex, and can cost
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Small inventors rarely, if ever, win interference
proceedings.”); Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority
Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1322–23 (2003) (finding that
interference proceedings, adjudicating which inventor was first to invent, are more
often initiated by large companies against small companies).
19. See infra Part III.D.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part VI.
26. See infra Part VII.
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II. THE GENERAL GRACE PERIOD AND THE SAFETY-NET
GRACE PERIOD
The policy goals of a grace period—allowing unintended or
necessary prefiling disclosures to perfect the invention and prepare
it for application—stand in contrast to the policy goals of patent
law that (1) the public should have certainty in knowing which
inventions are open to free competition, (2) that patent terms
should not be extended beyond their statutory limits, and (3) that
27
inventors are to be compelled to apply for patent rights promptly.
Grace periods, however, vary significantly in the scope of
protection they afford. This article separates grace periods into two
distinct concepts—the general grace period and the safety-net
grace period—to properly analyze the safety-net grace period as an
international best practice, notably absent under the European
Patent Convention.
A.

The General Grace Period

The concept of a general grace period includes (1) a time
period during which an inventor’s disclosure does not constitute
prior art, (2) an enumeration of the types of disclosures permitted
by the inventor, (3) a protection against disclosures of subject
matter derived from the inventor, and (4) a right to claim priority
under the Paris Convention to first-filed national applications
28
invoking the grace period.
The grace period proposed as Article 12 in the Basic Proposal
of the Patent Law Treaty (PLT) illustrates a general grace period:
Disclosures Not Affecting Patentability (Grace Period)
(1) [Circumstances of Disclosure Not Affecting
Patentability] Disclosure of information which otherwise
would affect the patentability of an invention claimed in
the application shall not affect the patentability of that
invention where the information was disclosed, during the
12 months preceding the filing date or, where priority is
claimed, the priority date of the application,
(i) by the inventor,
(ii) by an Office and the information was contained
27. See generally MOY, supra note 4, § 8:207 (quoting TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l
Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (discussing the policy
justifications for the novelty requirement).
28. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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(a) in another application filed by the inventor
and should not have been disclosed by the
Office, or
(b) in an application filed without the
knowledge or consent of the inventor by a third
party which obtained the information direct or
indirectly from the inventor, or
(iii) by a third party which obtained the information
direct or indirectly from the inventor.
(2) [“Inventor”] For the purposes of paragraph (1),
“inventor” also means any person who, at the filing date of
the application, had the right to the patent.
(3) [No Time Limit for Invoking Grace Period] The
effects of paragraph (1) may be invoked at any time.
(4) [Evidence] Where the applicability of paragraph (1)
is contested, the party invoking the effects of that
paragraph shall have the burden of proving, or of making
the conclusion likely, that the conditions of that
29
paragraph are fulfilled.
When adopted unilaterally, the general grace period,
30
It
including priority rights, presents a significant problem.
confers benefits not only to applicants disclosing prior to filing an
application but also to applicants of national offices with a grace
period filing applications within the twelve months under the Paris
Convention. This creates an imbalance between offices with a
general grace period that allow priority under the Paris Convention
and offices that do not offer priority under the Paris Convention—
allowing some users up to two years from disclosure to application
31
filing.
The disparate treatment of applicants in the national
offices has been a driver in the demand that a general grace
period can be introduced by international consensus only—and
contributed to its failure.
The priority requirement, however, does not contribute
directly to the above stated policy goals of a grace period—allowing
unintended or necessary prefiling disclosures to perfect the
29. Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing
the Paris Convention as far as Patents are Concerned, The Hague, Neth., June 3–
28, 1991, The “Basic Proposal” for the Traty and the Regulations, WIPO Doc.
PLT/DC/3 (1990) [hereinafter Patent Law Treaty Diplomatic Conference of June
1991] (emphasis added).
30. See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 12.
31. Id.
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invention and prepare it for application. Therefore, the general
grace-period concept can rightfully be criticized for being
susceptible to use as a strategy to delay the filing of an application
and creating third-party uncertainty as to what subject matter is
32
publicly available. That is, it directly contravenes the purpose of
first-to-file.
B.

The Safety-Net Grace Period

The safety-net grace period is simple, and more limited, when
compared with the general grace period. Safety-net grace periods,
where they exist, do not grant priority rights under the Paris
Convention and do not protect against intervening disclosures not
derived from the original invention, but they do protect a broad
range of disclosures. For example, the grace period under the AIA,
the Korean grace period, and the recently amended Japanese grace
33
period all protect all acts disclosing an invention.
The purposes of a safety-net grace period are to protect
unsophisticated applicants against mistakes and to balance the
needs of the various users of the patent system by allowing
necessary prefiling disclosures. The limited scope of subject matter
protected compels the disclosing inventor to file a patent
application as soon as possible to avoid intervening disclosures that
34
will be deemed prior art.
The safety-net grace period, then,
cannot be used as a filing strategy because the risk of an
intervening disclosure is too great.
The safety-net grace period therefore encourages prompt
disclosure, while also reasonably meeting the policy goals of noninterference with statutory term limits and clear delineation as to
which knowledge belongs in the public domain. It is therefore
consistent with first-to-file because it is easy to administer and does
35
not create unreasonable legal uncertainty to third parties.
32. See U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSES TO THE
UK CONSULTATION ON GRACE PERIODS FOR PATENTS 33 (2002); GALAMA, supra note
9, at 13–14.
33. See infra Parts III.B.2–3.
34. GALAMA, supra note 9, at 7–8.
35. According to the Japan Patent Office (JPO), the examination process is
not negatively affected by the existence of a safety-net grace period. TEGERNSEE
EXPERTS GRP., STUDY MANDATED BY THE TEGERNSEE HEADS: GRACE PERIOD 11 (2012).
Instead, there is “no significant difference” in how the JPO examines applications
using the grace period and applications not using the grace period. Id. The grace
period available to applications filed in Japan is discussed infra Part III.B.2.
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III. GRACE PERIODS—THE UNITED STATES, THE MAJOR OFFICES,
AND THE REST OF THE WORLD
A.

The United States
1.

Brief Background

United States patent law has evolved from requiring absolute
novelty to a system in which the policy needs of all users are
36
balanced by allowing prefiling disclosures. United States patent
law requires prompt disclosure and limits patent rights to the
statutory term but allows inventors the opportunity to perfect and
37
test the invention.
Yet, the United States’ grace period—as it existed until March
16, 2013—was much more generous than grace periods in first-tofile countries in that it protected against independent third-party
38
disclosures. This was a necessary protection under a first-to-invent
system because the original inventor’s invention date was
39
controlling. Grace periods under first-to-file laws instead protect
against only third-party disclosures where they are derived from the
40
original invention.
Given this contrast, grace-period
harmonization assumed a prominent role as Congress deliberated
41
patent reform—including a change to first-to-file.
36. MOY, supra note 4, §§ 8:209–:212 (citing Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp.,
28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). The Patent Act of 1836 required absolute
novelty. Id. § 2:209. While the patent acts of 1790 and 1793 did not explicitly
require an invention to be novel, the Supreme Court held that the Act of 1793 did
require novelty as of the filing date. Id. (citing Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 7
(1829)). The absolute novelty requirement, however, was replaced in the Patent
Act of 1839 with a two-year grace period, motivated by the need for employers to
use employees’ inventions prior to an application being filed. Id. § 8:210. As the
distribution of knowledge increased, so did the need to bar inventions based on
publicly available information that had not yet been put into use or on sale. Id.
§ 8:211. The Patent Act of August 5, 1939, therefore reduced the grace period to
one year. Id. § 8:212 (“In particular, the Senate Report accompanying that act
observed that the grace period allowed the inventor to file a valid patent
application ‘even when the public may have come to believe that the invention is
open to anyone.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 76-876, at 1–2 (1939))).
37. See infra Parts III.A.2.
38. See, e.g., GALAMA, supra note 9, at 8 (questioning if grace period is an
appropriate term in a first-to-file system because “there is not a ‘grace,’ it is the
first inventor who is entitled to a patent”).
39. See MOY, supra note 4, § 8:35.
40. See infra Parts III.B–C.
41. See Bagley, supra note 1, at 1058. International negotiations on the topic
predicated a quid pro quo, trading grace period harmonization in Europe (and
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The House of Representatives, in passing the Patent Reform
Act of 2007, stipulated that the act was only to take effect “90 days
after the date on which the President issues an Executive order
containing the President’s finding that [the Japanese and
European] authorities have adopted a grace period having
substantially the same effect as that contained under the
42
amendments made by this section . . . .” The efforts to exchange
the United States first-to-invent regime for a grace period were
43
ultimately unsuccessful.
The AIA was passed without a similar
requirement, and the new grace period contains significant
limitations that closely align with grace periods in other first-to-file
countries.
2.

The AIA Grace Period

The adoption of first-to-file on March 16, 2013, entails changes
44
to the grace period due to amendments of 35 U.S.C. § 102. Firstto-file was adopted to reduce legal uncertainty resulting in
45
interference proceedings and litigation regarding invention dates.
Deeming first-to-invent to be “costly and complex,” first-to-file was
touted to create legal certainty “necessary to raise capital, expand
46
businesses and create jobs.” As a result, three important aspects
pertaining to the grace period—the date from which the grace
period is calculated, the scope of disclosures protected, and the

the rest of the world) for the United States’ adoption of first to file. See GALAMA,
supra note 9, at 6; H. Bardehle, Decisive Phase in the Discussion of the Grace Period, 3
EPI INFORMATION 106, 108 (1999).
42. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong., sec. 3(k)(1)(a) (2007); see also Bagley, supra note
1, at 1058; Renee E. Metzler, Comment, Not All Grace Periods Are Created Equal:
Building a Grace Period from the Ground Up, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 371, 372
n.1 (2009).
43. The Senate companion bill to House Bill 1908 (Senate Bill 1145) failed
to come before the Senate for full consideration. Comprehensive Patent Reform
Legislation: The Road Ahead in the 111th Congress, KING & SPALDING, 1 (Sept. 30,
2008), http://www.kslaw.com/Library/publication/ca093008.pdf.
Further,
Senate Bill 1145 did not contain a similar enactment provision to H.R. 1908 sec.
3(k)(1)(a). S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007).
44. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, AMERICA INVENTS ACT OF 2011: ANALYSIS AND
CROSS-REFERENCES § 2 (2011), available at http://www.chisum.com/wp-content
/uploads/AIAOverview.pdf.
45. See, e.g., Talking Points: Patent Reform, U.S. HOUSE OF REP.
JUDICIARY COMM., 1–2, http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Patent%20Reform
%20PDFS/Patent%20Reform%20Talking%20Points.pdf (last visited Mar. 31,
2013).
46. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/12

10

Struve: Ending Unnecessary Novelty Destruction: Why Europe Should Adopt t

1414

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

scope of subject matter protected—are amended. The result is a
more limited grace period, one that is well within the safety-net
47
grace period parameters.
a.

The Effective Filing Date

At the center of the AIA is the change to use the effective filing
date of an application to determine whether disclosures constitute
prior art. This change eliminates the aforementioned uncertainty
resulting from invention date disputes. Instead, under the AIA an
inventor first to invent may not receive a patent if an independent
inventor of the same subject matter was the first to file an
application.
Pre-AIA, the grace period was calculated as twelve months
48
from the date of disclosure by the inventor or by a third party.
Therefore, the grace period not only protected the inventor from
his own disclosures, but where the inventor could establish an
invention date prior to the third party’s disclosure, the disclosure
would not constitute prior art if the inventor filed his application
49
within twelve months. This principle clearly follows from a first-to50
invent system by protecting the rights of the original inventor.
The change to first-to-file under the AIA necessarily eliminates
protection against independent third-party disclosures of
nonidentical subject matter made prior to the patent application

47. It must be noted that at the time of writing this note, discussions remain
regarding the final interpretation of § 102(b). Post-vote colloquy shows an intent
to retain the pre-AIA grace period. 157 CONG. REC. S1496–97 (daily ed. Mar. 9,
2011) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
[T]his provision ensures that an inventor who has made a public
disclosure . . . is fully protected during the grace period. The inventor is
protected not only from the inventor’s own disclosure being prior art
against the inventor’s claimed invention, but also against the disclosures
of any of the same subject matter in disclosures made by others being prior
art against the inventor’s claimed invention . . . .
Id. (emphasis added). The pre-AIA grace period, however, is not consistent with
effective use of first-to-file because the ability to preserve priority for broad subject
matter contravenes the policy of reducing legal uncertainty by abandoning use of
the invention date.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); CHISUM, supra note 44, § 3.3.4.
49. See Ann McCrackin et al., Comparison of the Current U.S. First-to-Invent
System with the First-Inventor-to-File System Proposed in the Patent Reform Act of 2011
(S.23), PATENTLY-O (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/03
/mccrackinpatentreform.html, for a brief comparison.
50. See CHISUM, supra note 44, § 3.3.2.3.
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date by an inventor with an earlier disclosure or invention date.
Therefore, the subject matter of any third-party disclosure not
derived from the inventor made prior to the inventor’s effective
52
filing date will constitute prior art.
b.

Scope of Disclosures Protected

The changes to section 102(a) broaden the definition of prior
art, but by implication of the amended section 102(b), the
amended section 102(a) also broadens the scope of disclosures that
53
are protected by a one-year grace period. The amended novelty
provision under section 102(a)(1) states, “A person shall be
entitled to a patent unless—the claimed invention was patented,
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the
54
claimed invention . . . .”
For the purpose of the grace period, an important change has
been made to section 102(a). A “catch-all” provision has been
included in the amended section 102(a), making prior art anything
55
“otherwise available to the public.”
According to the final
Examination Guidelines, the “otherwise available to the public”
provision’s focus is whether a disclosure was “available to the
public” and not “the means by which the claimed invention became
available to the public or on whether a disclosure constitutes a
‘printed publication’ or falls within another category of prior art as
56
defined in AIA 35 [§] U.S.C. 102(a)(1).”
That is, all acts
disclosing an invention constitute prior art.
By implication of the amended section 102(b), the amended
section 102(a) also broadens the scope of disclosures that are
57
While section 102(a)
protected by a one-year grace period.
enunciates disclosures considered prior art—including the “catch-

51. Id.
52. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1),
§ 102(b), 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
53. See Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,075
(Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
54. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)–(a)(1) (to be
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)) (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,075.
57. See id.
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all” provision—section 102(b) only refers to “disclosures.” The
final Examination Guidelines emphasize that “the Office is treating
the term ‘disclosure’ as a generic expression intended to
encompass the documents and activities enumerated in AIA 35
59
U.S.C. [§] 102(a).” Therefore, acts disclosing an invention are
protected by the grace period, including future means for
dissemination of information.
c.

Scope of Subject Matter Protected

The proposed Examination Guidelines contained a significant
60
(and controversial) limitation on subject matter:
Even if the only differences between the subject matter in
the prior art disclosure that is relied upon under 35
U.S.C. [§] 102(a) and the subject matter publicly
disclosed by the inventor before such prior art disclosure
are mere insubstantial changes, or only trivial or obvious
variations, the exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B)
61
does not apply.
Subsequent clarification is provided in the final Examination
58. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(b)(1) (to be
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
59. Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,075.
60. It is unclear whether members of Congress understood the narrow scope
of subject matter that can effectively be protected under first-to-file. As a result,
subsequent discussion by practitioners and academia of the intended scope of
subject matter protection was based primarily on a postvote colloquy between
Senators Kyl and Hatch. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; infra notes 61,
66.
61. Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 43,759, 43,767
(proposed July 26, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (emphasis added).
Many organizations, international government agencies, research institutions,
corporations, and individuals voiced their concern with the proposed guidelines.
See, e.g., Letter from Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Director, Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation, to Commisioner for Patents (Oct. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/warf_20121005.pdf. Specifically,
commenters are dissatisfied that the grace period under first-to-file will no longer
protect against intervening independent third-party disclosures of substantially the
same subject matter, questioning whether the statutory language is rendered
superfluous by the current U.S. Patent and Trademark Office interpretation.
Letter from William G. Barber, Am. Intellecutal Prop. Law Assoc. President, to
David J. Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. and Dir. of the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Oct. 5, 2012), Comments to the USPTO on
First-Inventor-to-File, available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments
/aipla_20121005.pdf.
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Guidelines, which moderate the language used but maintain that
subject matter in a prior art disclosure must be the same—not
“substantially” the same—subject matter to fall within the grace
62
period. The amended grace period under section 102(b) thereby
limits grace-period protection narrowly for subject matter—that is,
it effectively operates as a safety net for subject matter actually
disclosed by the inventor or another with a right to the invention
only. Any independent intervening third-party disclosure may
destroy the first disclosure’s novelty if minor variations exist in the
63
subject matter disclosed.
Therefore, U.S. applicants can no
longer rely on the grace period to exclude a subsequent disclosure
of similar subject matter, even where a prior invention date can be
64
proved. This may significantly impact the prior filing practices of
sophisticated applicants and require stricter control mechanisms in
large organizations to control disclosures by publication, sale, or
65
use. As a result, to avoid constituting prior art under the AIA, any
prefiling disclosure should be evaluated for patentability and an
application should be filed as soon as possible.
This is a clear break from first-to-invent, necessary to enforce a
66
true first-to-file system. It eliminates the discrepancy that exists
62. Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,066. The
final Examination Guidelines clarify that the grace period under section 102(b)
will apply where the same subject matter in an intervening disclosure is not
verbatim and where the intervening disclosure is a general description of the same
subject matter previously disclosed. Id. at 11,077.
63. See id. at 11,067, 11,077; Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America
Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 74–81 (2012).
The statutory provisions were not drafted to permit an inventor to wiggle
out of prior art and recover patentability for an invention once dedicated
to the public through publication of the work of an independent,
unrelated inventor even if that work amounts to an obvious variation of
what the first-publishing inventor made public.
Id. at 76–77.
64. Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,073.
65. See Paul Craane, IP: Does Your Invention Disclosure Form
Send the Right Message?, INSIDE COUNSEL (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www
.insidecounsel.com/2012/08/14/ip-does-your-invention-disclosure-form-send-the
-ri?t=ip&page=2 (encouraging early disclosure of inventions to in-house legal
departments to facilitate prompt filing of patent applications); John Villasenor,
Commentary: To Protect Your Next Bright Idea, Mind What You Say and When You Say It,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 6, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/To-Protect
-Your-Next-Bright/129653/ (discussing appropriate measures to be taken by
universities to comply with the AIA grace period).
66. It is, however, unclear if Congress intended to completely abandon the
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internationally where different people can own patents on the
same invention due to the ability in the United States to prove an
67
earlier invention date.
It also evidences the sacrifice United
States’ patent law made as to features beneficial to sophisticated
applicants in favor of small and unsophisticated applicants—both
domestic and foreign—who benefit from a simpler system free
68
from the high cost of interference proceedings.
d.

Invoking the Grace Period
69

Unlike the grace periods in Korea and Japan, there is no
requirement under the AIA that the applicant must invoke the
70
grace period at the time of filing. The applicant may do so in the
specification of the application and must provide documentation to
overcome a rejection based on the prefiling disclosure or to
71
disqualify an intervening third-party disclosure.
B.

Grace Periods in the Major Offices

Before proceeding with an analysis of the viability of
international harmonization of a safety-net grace period, the grace
periods in force in the other four major patent offices must be
evaluated. These offices are the European Patent Office (EPO),
the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), the Korean Intellectual Property
Office (KIPO), and the State Intellectual Property Office of the
People’s Republic of China (SIPO). Including the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), these five offices account
for ninety percent of all patent applications filed, and together they
constitute the IP5—a forum independent of any international
72
treaties.

ability to receive rights as the “first-to-publish.” Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative
History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 482–85 (2011).
67. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 124 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).
68. Id.
69. See infra Parts III.B.2–3.
70. Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,076
(Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
71. Id.
72. See The Five IP Offices (IP5) and Its Vision, FIVE IP OFFS., http://www
.fiveipoffices.org/about-us.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
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Europe

Since the enactment of the European Patent Convention in
1973, European applicants have effectively been without protection
against disclosures made by applicants unaware of, or unable to
73
comply with, the absolute novelty requirement.
In place of a grace period, the European Patent Convention
provides for two types of nonprejudicial disclosures under Article
55 where disclosure is made within six months of the application
74
filing date. First, disclosures are protected from “evident abuse”
75
by third parties. “Evident abuse” requires actual intent to cause
harm or, alternatively, constructive knowledge that harm could
76
ensue from the disclosure.
A breach of a nondisclosure

73. Applicants in Spain continue to have a limited grace period available
only to applicants when filing a patent application directly in each country.
Straus, supra note 1, at 37, 40. In addition, both Germany and the United
Kingdom had grace periods prior to joining the European Patent Convention. Id.
at 15–20. There is no data indicating that the grace period in Germany caused
“uncertainty of law” to third parties—the argument asserted against the
introduction of a grace period under the European Patent Convention. Id. at 16;
Heinz Bardehle, Movement in the Dispute About Again Introducing the Novelty Grace
Period? (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Further, German
law provides a grace period for utility model applications. GER. UTIL. MODEL LAW,
§ 3(1) (2009) (“Description or use within the six months preceding the date
relevant for the priority of the application shall not be taken into consideration if
it is based on the conception of the applicant or his predecessor in title.”).
74. European Patent Convention, supra note 14, art. 55(1). Article 55 reads
in full:
(1) For the application of Article 54, a disclosure of the invention shall
not be taken into consideration if it occurred no earlier than six months
preceding the filing of the European patent application and if it was due
to, or in consequence of:
(a) an evident abuse in relation to the applicant or his legal
predecessor, or
(b) the fact that the applicant or his legal predecessor has displayed
the invention at an official, or officially recognised, international
exhibition falling within the terms of the Convention on
international exhibitions signed at Paris on 22 November 1928 and
last revised on 30 November 1972.
(2) In the case of paragraph 1(b), paragraph 1 shall apply only if the
applicant states, when filing the European patent application, that the
invention has been so displayed and files a supporting certificate within
the time limit and under the conditions laid down in the Implementing
Regulations.
Id. art. 55.
75. Id. art. 55(1)(a).
76.
TRILATERAL OFFICES, CATALOGUE OF REMAINING DIFFERENCES 39 (2012),
available at http://www.trilateral.net/catalogue/catalogue2012.pdf.
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77

agreement may not meet this standard.
Second, an invention
displayed at an “official, or officially recognized international
78
exhibition” will be deemed nonprejudicial, if the applicant states
79
at the time of filing that the invention was so displayed and within
80
four months provides a certificate of exhibition. However, only
81
ten exhibitions have had this designation since 2002.
It follows that the protection for disclosures prior to the
application filing date is extremely narrow both in terms of scope
of disclosures and scope of subject matter. There are no
mechanisms for an inventor to cure an unintended prefiling
disclosure or for a researcher to present his findings to a journal
prior to filing an application. Applicants must strictly adhere to the
82
principle of filing first and publishing later—if a patent is desired.
83
This illustrates the “philosophical difference” between Europe
and the United States, Korea, and Japan in pursuing policies that
84
accommodate the needs of all users.
77. See Cutting Tools/ACMC, Case No. T436/92, at 18 (Bds. of App. of the
EPO 1995), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf
/t920436eu1.pdf (holding that the “mere negligence or breach of confidentiality
does not suffice” to constitute evident abuse under Article 55 of the European
Patent Convention).
78. European Patent Convention, supra note 14, art. 55(1)(b).
79. Id. art. 55(2).
80. Id.; see European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination in the European
Patent Office, pt. A, ch. IV, § 3.1 (2012).
81. Therefore, the protection afforded inventions displayed at official, or
officially recognized international exhibitions is practically moot. See EPO
OFFICIAL J. (2002–2012). The fourth issue of the journal in each year lists official,
or officially recognized international exhibitions under “International Treaties.”
The themes of the recognized exhibitions have primarily been horticultural and
sustainability. Id.
82. GALAMA, supra note 9, at 21; GERMAN PATENT & TRADE MARK OFFICE,
PATENTS: AN INFORMATION BROCHURE ON PATENTS 19 (2010) [hereinafter GERMAN
PATENT
BROCHURE],
available
at
http://www.dpma.de/docs/service
/veroeffentlichungen/broschueren_en/patents_engl.pdf (“A patent can only be
granted for innovations that have not yet been communicated to the public,
neither in writing nor orally. The right way is to file before publishing.”).
83. See SYLVIE A. STROBEL, THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT 2011
SUBSTANTIVE
PATENT
LAW
HARMONIZATION:
A
EUROPEAN
AND
PERSPECTIVE 5 (2012), available at http://www.brevet.lu/cms/brevet/content.nsf
/0/17351D95C6E657D3C12579F90048431C/$file/PresentaitonStrobel_26042012
.pdf.
84. The EPO has maintained its philosophy of “legal certainty” in rejecting
attempts to incorporate a grace period to accommodate academic researchers and
unsophisticated applicants. See Straus, supra note 1, at 22; see also infra Part IV.A.
In contrast, the American, Japanese, and Korean grace periods have all expanded
to adjust to modern knowledge-sharing and invention processes. See supra Part
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Japan
85

Japanese patent law includes a six-month grace period.
Under the Patent Act’s Article 30, all acts (disclosures) which
otherwise constitute prior art under Article 29 are protected by the
86
grace period. The scope of disclosures protected was significantly
expanded in 2011, and the new Japanese grace period is closely
aligned with the scope of disclosures protected by the grace periods
87
in the United States and Korea.
The previous Japanese grace
period was found not to be able to “sufficiently respond to other
diversifying forms of publications that can be used to announce
88
inventions,” and therefore its application did “not match the
purpose of the Patent Act, which is to contribute to the
89
development of the industry.”
As with the grace period in Korea, the Japanese grace period
cannot be used as a strategic filing mechanism because intervening
third-party disclosures or patent applications will constitute prior
90
art. The grace period is therefore only a safety net, and inventors
III.A.; infra Part III.B.
85. Tokkyohō [Japan Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 30(1) (2012),
translated in JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR APPLICANTS TO
SEEK THE APPLICATION OF EXCEPTIONS TO LACK OF NOVELTY OF INVENTION,
CORRESPONDING TO THE PATENT ACT ARTICLE 30 REVISED IN 2011, at 1
(2011) [hereinafter JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES], available at http://www.jpo.go
.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/pdf/e_pae_paa30/e_tebiki.pdf.
86. See JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at 1. The types of
disclosures protected under the grace period, however, were significantly
expanded in 2011 by the amendment to Article 30 of the Japan Patent Act—
effective April 1, 2012. Id. Prior to the 2011 amendment to the Japan Patent Act,
the grace period was available only to certain enumerated types of disclosures:
disclosures “made public through the implementation of a test, a printed
publication, an electric telecommunication line, writing presented at an academic
conference designated by the Commissioner of the Patent Office, or display at a
specific exhibition, etc.” Id.
87. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1),
§ 102(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1))
(protecting any disclosure “otherwise available to the public”); Patent Act, Act No.
11117, Dec. 2, 2011, art. 1 (S. Kor.).
88. JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 89 (2011) [hereinafter
JPO ANNUAL REPORT 2011], available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/toushin_e
/kenkyukai_e/pdf/annual_report2011/part2.pdf.
89. JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at 1; see JPO ANNUAL REPORT
2011, supra note 88, at 89.
90. JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at 1 (“[I]f, for example, a
third party had filed a patent application for the same invention or had published
such invention prior to the filing date of your patent application, then you can't
obtain a patent for your invention.”). See also TEGERNSEE EXPERTS GRP., supra note
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are strongly encouraged to file a patent application as soon as
91
possible after disclosing. Applicants are also required, at the time
of filing, to submit a statement of intention to take advantage of the
grace period and within thirty days file documentation proving that
92
the application meets the requirements under Article 30.
3.

Korea

Korea’s grace period was expanded from six months to twelve
months under the Free Trade Agreement between the United
States of America and the Republic of Korea effective March 15,
93
This change to Korean law was a product of mutual
2012.
agreement between Korea and the United States as to the purpose
94
of patent law.
35, at 50.
91. JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at 1 (“[I]t is strongly
recommended that the patent application should be filed as early as possible.”).
92. Japan Patent Act art. 30(3) (2012); JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra
note 85, at 2–4. Extensive examples of the documentation to be submitted when
invoking the grace period can be found in the “Operational Guidelines.” Id. at 2–
27. From the declarations invoking the grace period, Japan is able to keep
detailed statistics on the use of its grace period (although public access to the
statistics is limited). Recent statistics show that in 2011, only 0.44% of Japanese
applications invoked Article 30(2). TEGERNSEE EXPERTS GRP., supra note 35, at 29.
In April through June of 2012, 28.7% were filed by large Japanese corporations,
around 35% by Japanese government and research institutes, and 22.1% by small
and middle-sized enterprises. Id. at 31. These numbers clearly show that a grace
period benefits universities and small- and middle-sized enterprises, but also large
corporations, which are otherwise opposed to a grace period in Europe.
93. United States-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor. art.
18.8(1), June 30, 2007, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements
/Bilateral/Republic_of_Korea_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html;
U.S.-Korea
Free Trade Agreement: New Opportunities for U.S. Exporters Under the U.S.-Korea Free
Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade
-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). The
extension of the grace period to twelve months was the only amendment to Article
30 of the Korean Patent Act—all other provisions remain unchanged. Hyejung
Lee & Stephen T. Bang, Patent Law Amendment: Extension of Safe Harbour Grace
Period for Novelty, INT’L L. OFF. (June 25, 2012), http://www.internationallawoffice
.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=5e3753ae-2ee2-4473-8a8d-df22d38c538b.
94. The grace period was extended to twelve months to harmonize with the
United States’ grace period because six months “was not long enough to evaluate
sufficiently market value, patentability or other factors crucial to deciding whether
to file a patent application.” Lee & Bang, supra note 93. The purpose of the grace
period under Article 30 of the Korean Patent Act “is to encourage an applicant to
obtain a patent even after he or she publishes his or her own invention and to
encourage early publication of an invention to help development of the national
industry.” KOR. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, REQUIREMENT FOR PATENTABILITY, ch.
2, § 5.2 (2012) [hereinafter KIPO REQUIREMENTS], available at http://www.kipo.go

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 12

2013]

ENDING UNNECESSARY NOVELTY DESTRUCTION

1423

Under Article 30 of the Korean Patent Act, any prior art, as
defined under Article 29(1), does not anticipate the application,
provided that: (1) the disclosure is made by a person having a right
to file the patent application, or (2) the disclosure was made
“against the intention of the person having the right to obtain a
95
patent.” The disclosures protected by the grace period thereby
include any “[i]nventions publicly known or worked in . . . Korea or
in a foreign country prior to the filing of the patent application;
[or] [i]nventions described in a publication distributed
in . . . Korea or in a foreign country . . . or inventions made
accessible to the public through telecommunication lines,”
96
including the Internet.
Therefore, the scope of disclosures protected under Article 30
is broad and enables Article 30 to be used as a safety net for
97
unintentional disclosures. “The purpose of [the grace period] is
to encourage an applicant to obtain a patent even after he or she
publishes his or her own invention and to encourage early
publication of an invention to help development of the national
98
industry.”
Similar to the provisions of the Japanese grace period, the
Korean Examination Guidelines state that Article 30 cannot be
taken advantage of where an identical disclosure is made between
99
the original disclosure and the application filing date.
.kr/upload/en/download/RequirementsforPatentability.pdf.
95. Patent Act, Act No. 11,117, Dec. 2, 2011, art. 30(1) (S. Kor.).
96. Id. art. 29(1). “A telecommunication line includes public bulletin board,
e-mail group using a telecommunication line as well as Internet. Moreover, a new
electric or electronic telecommunication method which would appear in the
future as the technology advances, shall also be included.” KIPO REQUIREMENTS,
supra note 94, ch. 2, § 3.4.2.
97. “Whether an invention is publicly known by a person with the right to
apply for a patent or by a person against the intention of a person with the right to
apply for a patent, the type of disclosure is not restricted.” KIPO REQUIREMENTS,
supra note 94, ch. 2, § 5.3.3(3).
98. Id. ch. 2, § 5.2.
99. Id. ch. 2, § 5.5.3(2).
When there are [sic] an invention (A) which is filed for claiming that it is
not considered to be publicly known and another invention (B) which is
the same as invention [(A)] but laid open by a third person between the
date of disclosing the invention (A) under Article 30 paragraph (1)
subparagraph (1) and the filing date of the invention (A), an examiner
shall refuse the application of invention (A) for the reason of lacking
novelty, except the obvious fact: the laying open of the invention (B) was
made by learning from the disclosure (A).
Id.
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To take advantage of Article 30, an applicant having selfdisclosed must, at the time of filing the application, state that the
application intends to claim advantage under Article 30 and submit
a document proving the “relevant facts” within thirty days of filing
100
the application.
4.

China

Compared to Japan and Korea, the grace period in Chinese
patent law is much more narrow. The grace period, however, does
offer additional protection that is not available to applicants before
the EPO.
Namely, while Article 24 of the Patent Law of People’s
Republic of China extends grace-period protection to disclosures at
recognized international exhibitions and involuntary third-party
disclosures, it also protects first-time publications at “a specified
101
academic or technological conference.”
Even if this provision is
far from the scope of disclosures permitted in the United States,
Japan, and Korea, it still more appropriately recognizes the need
for public disclosure of certain knowledge prior to the filing of a
patent application, as compared to the nonprejudicial disclosure
102
protection under Article 55 of the European Patent Convention.
The Chinese government has shown strong willingness to
harmonize its patent law to international standards through

100. Patent Act, art. 30(2) (S. Kor.). Where a disclosure is made by a third
party without title to the invention, the applicant with the legal right to file the
application is not required to declare the intention to claim advantage under
Article 30(1). KIPO REQUIREMENTS, supra note 94, ch. 2, § 5.4.2.
101. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008) (China). Article 24 reads in full:
Within six months before the date of application, an invention for which
an application is filed for a patent does not lose its novelty under any of
the following circumstances:
(1) It is exhibited for the first time at an international exhibition
sponsored or recognized by the Chinese Government;
(2) It is published for the first time at a specified academic or
technological conference; and
(3) Its contents are divulged by others without the consent of the
applicant.
Id. art. 24.
102. Critics may find that the protection granted to disclosures made at
officially recognized academic or technological conferences is subject to
determinations that may be made based on political considerations. See Metzler,
supra note 42, at 390–91.
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negotiations with the United States Trade Representative and the
103
USPTO at various international forums, including the IP5.
Therefore, while China has a very limited safety-net grace period at
present, one can reasonably expect the grace period to be aligned
104
with United States, Japanese, and Korean law in the future.
C.

Other Countries with a Grace Period

Grace periods are not limited to the major offices. In addition
to the United States, Japan, Korea, and China, sixty-eight countries’
national laws offer grace period protection more generous than
105
Article 55 of the European Patent Convention.
The protection
offered varies in scope from publication of disclosures made to
scientific societies, to protection from all acts constituting a
disclosure by the inventor, including the right to claim priority
under the Paris Convention (i.e., a general grace period). In fact,
forty-six countries’ national laws provide for a general grace period
106
with Paris Convention priority.
107
Although Article 12 of the “Basic Proposal” was not included
in the PLT as adopted, many countries incorporated a similar
108
article into national law. As a result, out of the top fifteen patent
109
offices in the world, when measured by total applications filed,
103. See The Summary of the 11th Trilateral Policy Dialogue Meeting Among JPO,
KIPO and SIPO, JAPAN PAT. OFF. (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.jpo.go.jp/torikumi_e
/kokusai_e/11th_meeting.htm; U.S. and China Conclude 22nd Session of the Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, (Nov. 21,
2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/november
/us-and-china-conclude-22nd-session-joint-commissi.
104. Considering Chinese patent law was only enacted in 1984, it has been
through a remarkable development, in which the Chinese government has proven
that it will continue to improve its patent system and enforcement of patent rights.
See generally Rachel T. Wu, Comment, Awakening the Sleeping Dragon: The Evolving
Chinese Patent Law and Its Implications for Pharmaceutical Patents, 34 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 549 (2011).
105. The seventy-two countries are those countries with national laws allowing
a broader scope of disclosures than Article 55 of the European Patent Convention
(i.e., permits prefiling disclosures by the inventor not strictly confined to official,
or officially recognized international exhibitions). See Frederik Struve, Novelty
Grace Periods: A National Law Survey, MITCHELL OPEN ACCESS 1 (Jan. 1, 2013),
http://open.wmitchell.edu/stusch/3.
106. Id.
107. See supra Part II.A.
108. Straus, supra note 1, at 30–31.
109. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 2012 WIPO IP FACTS AND FIGURES 17
(2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en
/statistics/943/wipo_pub_943_2012.pdf.
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only the European offices—the EPO, Germany, France, and Great
Britain—do not afford any grace period protection for at least
110
some type of prefiling disclosure.
Australia, Brazil, Canada,
India, Mexico, and Russia are all first-to-file systems operating with
111
It can therefore be intimated that
a variation of a grace period.
although some countries offer a general grace period, the safetynet grace period at a minimum is already an international best
practice, which remains to be adopted by the EPO and the
European Patent Convention member countries.
D.

A Brief Overview of the Failure to Reach Agreement on a Harmonized
General Grace Period

Since nearly half of the members of the Patent Cooperation
Treaty have a grace period with broader rights than Article 55 of
112
the European Patent Convention, the question must be asked:
Why has Article 55 persisted in its current form?
The discussion on the introduction of an internationally
harmonized grace period has been ongoing for the past thirty years
as part of negotiations on broad substantive patent-law
113
harmonization. But the grace period negotiations have primarily
114
The
focused on adoption by treaty of a general grace period.
incongruence between the United States as a first-to-invent system
and the first-to-file systems in all other countries became a long115
held excuse for heels to be dug in on both sides of the argument.
The requirement of a quid pro quo—exchanging first-toinvent for European adoption of a general grace period—allowed
the negotiations and discussions between patent offices and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to remain abstract and
unnecessarily focused on an unlikely grand bargain in which all
national and regional patent offices would adhere to the exact
110. See generally Straus, supra note 1 (evaluating the arguments for and
against the introduction of a grace period in European patent law).
111. Struve, supra note 105.
112. Id.
113. Efforts to include a grace period in European patent law have been
underway since 1982. See Straus, supra note 1, at 7–8.
114. Various forums have been employed in attempts to reach international
agreement—most recently the Substantive Patent Law Treaty. See id. at 7–15;
Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J.
85, 89–90 (2007).
115. See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 6–7.
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116

same general grace period.
117
Therefore, the quid-pro-quo approach —advocated both by
United States law makers and users of the European Patent Office,
each fearful of forfeiting the strengths of their respective patent
118
systems —faced an insurmountable task of reaching international
119
agreement on detailed issues.
In the end, negotiations on substantive patent-law
harmonization failed primarily due to considerations not related to
120
the adoption of a general grace period.
This failed process,
however, should not discourage the major offices from pursuing a
best practice safety-net grace period that appropriately limits its
scope to preclude its use as a filing strategy.
IV. REFUTING THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST
GRACE PERIODS
A.

Legal Uncertainty

The primary argument against a general grace period is fairly
straightforward, citing “legal uncertainty” to third parties,
individual inventors, and small- and middle-sized enterprises
121
(SMEs).
Legal uncertainty is—unfortunately—an uncertain
122
The argument (presupposing priority rights will be
concept.
116. An international grace period thus required agreement as to several
aspects, including (1) length of the grace period, (2) type of disclosures protected,
(3) the people permitted to make protected disclosures, (4) ability to claim
priority in subsequent international applications, (5) if the grace period could be
invoked after filing the application, and (6) the evidentiary standard when
invoking the grace period—by the inventor or by a third party. See Patent Law
Treaty Diplomatic Conference of June 1991, supra note 29, at 21–22; GALAMA,
supra note 9, at 5–10; Straus, supra note 1, at 13.
117. See supra note 41.
118. GALAMA, supra note 9, at 6–7.
119. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
120. Straus, supra note 1, at 13.
121. SMEs are companies that employ fewer than 250 persons and have an
annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet
total not exceeding EUR 43 million. Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs):
What is an SME?, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme
/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 2, 2013).
122. See Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1737, 1768 n.100 (2011); Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal
Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (2010). Often, at the
request of the EPO, the expert opinion of Jan Galama is cited as spelling out the
arguments against a grace period. See Bagley, supra note 1, at 1056–57;
Roucounas, supra note 4, at 35; The Controversial “Grace Period,” EUR.
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included), however, is decidedly circular in its professed desire to
123
protect university researchers, individual inventors, and SMEs.
The thrust of the argument is that a grace period, whether six
or twelve months, will add a time period—in addition to the
eighteen months from application until publication—in which
third parties cannot know whether an invention is protected by
patentable rights. It is claimed that because a grace period allows
disclosed inventions to be publicly known, an undue burden is
placed on third parties to either wait or ascertain whether the
124
invention will later be claimed in a published patent application.
Prior-art searches therefore would not be as efficient compared to
those carried out under systems with absolute novelty, and
125
freedom-to-operate analysis would face similar obstacles.
The
argument further reasons that these impediments will drive up the
cost of investment decisions and result in delays in
126
commercialization of inventions.
The international patent system, however, is inherently
127
uncertain.
The argument against the introduction of a grace
period therefore promotes the illusion that without a grace period,
certainty is preserved. There is no documentation that patent
systems with a grace period have created legal uncertainty to third
parties resulting in impeded decisions on commercialization of
128
Third
inventions or driven up the cost of investment decisions.
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/research/infocentre/article_en.cfm?item=Result
%20of%20search&id=/comm/research/infocentre/export/02-07-soc03_105.html
&artid=105 (last updated Jan. 7, 2002).
123. Mr. Galama argues that a grace period would not be beneficial to
university researchers and SMEs because their inventions might be appropriated
by third parties through early disclosure or that the early disclosure would cause
loss of rights under the Paris Convention. GALAMA, supra note 9, at 11–14. It is
questionable, however, if Mr. Galama truly believes university researchers have any
role to play in the patent system: “[I]n a business environment it is widely accepted
that the personal freedom of scientist [sic] has to have its constraints.” Id. at 20.
Mr. Galama further states that “if scientists, universities etc. wished to become
players in the economic world, they would have to disregard some old habits.” Id.
at 23.
124. Id. at 13.
125. See id.
126. See id.; Roucounas, supra note 4, at 34–35.
127. See Stuart MacDonald, When Means Become Ends: Considering the Impact of
Patent Strategy on Innovation, 16 INFO. ECON. POL’Y 135, 138–39 (2004).
128. See Bardehle, supra note 73, at 2–3. Considering that seventy-two
countries have a grace period with broader protection than Article 55 of the
European Patent Convention—and no reports exist documenting adverse
effects—the argument of legal uncertainty appears untenable.
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parties, and large companies especially, already operate in a reality
in which the scope of an invention’s patentable rights are initially
determined at the grant of a patent but ultimately can only be
considered certain following opposition proceedings or
129
litigation.
The eighteen-month publication date, then, does not
serve as a benchmark for third parties to start engaging in use of
disclosed inventions with full certainty of non-infringement.
Further, the mechanics of the safety-net grace period,
including the grace periods employed in the United States, Japan,
and Korea, rarely will allow an inventor to take advantage of the full
temporal scope of a grace period—whether six or twelve months—
due to the risk of intervening prefiling publications constituting
130
prior art.
B.

Detrimental Reliance

The second argument is that absolute novelty is preferable
131
That is, if a
since it protects inventors from their own mistakes.
grace period were in place, inventors could rely on it to their
detriment because intervening disclosures might constitute prior
132
art.
Therefore, inventors risk deteriorating the exploitability of
133
their inventions by disclosing under a grace period.
In general, when a powerful industry purports to speak on
134
behalf of smaller actors, it should be cause for concern. So, too,
is the case when the patent counsel of one of the largest filers in
135
the EPO claims to advocate in the best interest of university
136
researchers, individual inventors, and SMEs.
Even so, it is
129. Straus, supra note 1, at 91; Mullally, supra note 122, at 1113.
130. The scenario of an invention remaining unpublished for up to thirty
months therefore seems unfounded because inventions under a safety-net grace
period must be filed as soon as possible after the initial disclosure to avoid the
potential loss of rights. As described in Part IV.B., this further eliminates Mr.
Galama’s concern that unsophisticated users of the patent system will
detrimentally rely on a grace period.
131. See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 12–13.
132. Id. at 11–12.
133. Id. at 18, 21.
134. See MacDonald, supra note 127, at 136.
135. Mr. Galama is listed on the expert opinion at Philips International B.V.
GALAMA, supra note 9, at 1. In 2011, Philips filed the second most applications in
the European Patent Office. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2011—
TOP APPLICANTS 1 (2012), available at http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon
/eponet.nsf/0/8AA0C5EA5DB73EAEC12579C2002B829B/$File/top_applicants
_en.pdf.
136. GALAMA, supra note 9, at 11–14. The insincerity of this alleged concern is
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advocated that granting inventors additional rights under a grace
period may result in those same rights not always being available if
intervening disclosures are made.
This argument fails because it disregards that the inventor, at
the very least, had an opportunity to remedy the prefiling
disclosure—an opportunity not available under absolute novelty.
Further, a safety-net grace period does not encourage reliance
because its purpose is to provide no more than a limited
opportunity for an applicant to remedy the prefiling disclosure.
C.

Nondisclosure Agreements and Provisional Applications

It follows naturally that those in favor of strict adherence to
absolute novelty also advocate that the best way to avoid novelty137
destroying disclosures is to file a patent application first.
While
nondisclosure agreements and provisional patent applications are
advocated as alternative means of protection prior to the filing of a
patent application, they do not provide adequate protection.
A nondisclosure agreement is a contract, the breach of which
is actionable.
But, a disclosure resulting from breach of
confidentiality may become prior art under the European Patent
Convention if the party in breach did not deliberately intend to
138
cause harm. This may cause a disclosure to be deemed prior art,
even where someone skilled in the art could not access the
139
disclosed information. Unsophisticated applicants may not know
that a nondisclosure agreement is required before revealing the
invention to potential collaborators, buyers, or investors. While
nondisclosure agreements will remain extremely important under a
safety-net grace period, the grace period will provide inventors an
opportunity to avoid complete novelty destruction of their
inventions.
not well disguised.
“[P]ersonal freedom of scientist[s] has to have its
constraints[,]” and “[t]he question whether or not a grace period should be
introduced has to be answered by the business, i.e. the management responsible
for investments etc.” Id. at 20.
137. Id. at 18–19, 21.
138. Cutting Tools/ACMC, supra note 77, at 18. A disclosure made in breach
of a confidentiality agreement constituted prior art because it was not made with
the “[d]eliberate intention to harm the other party,” or with “probabl[e] . . .
knowledge of the possibility of harm resulting from a planned breach” of the
confidentiality agreement, and therefore did not meet the “evident abuse”
standard under Article 55 of the European Patent Convention. Id.
139. ARMITAGE, supra note 9, at 5.
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Provisional patent applications are not available to EPO
applicants. Provisional applications may provide an initial filing
date, but the application must be able to fully enable later non140
provisional applications to preserve the earlier filing date.
Inventions may not be developed adequately to disclose the subject
matter, so as to fully support the claims included in the non141
provisional application.
Therefore, for provisional applications
to be as effective as a safety-net grace period, the European Patent
Convention would have to be amended both to include provisional
applications and to allow for much broader claim interpretation—a
far more complex change in national law and the European Patent
142
Convention than the introduction of a grace period.
V. THE SAFETY-NET GRACE PERIOD’S POSITIVE IMPACT
The major opponents to the introduction of a grace period
under the European Patent Convention have traditionally been
143
large companies.
These companies—at least in theory—derive
several advantages from a patent system without a grace period in
Europe. First, they benefit from a patent system that discourages
European academia from fully pursuing the commercial potential
of its inventions, often foregoing commercialization if publication
144
Second, large companies benefit where an
has occurred.
inventor takes advantage of a grace period in one jurisdiction but is
unable to seek protection in the EPO, leaving the subject matter
145
open to free exploitation.
It is also likely, however, that large companies themselves will
benefit from a safety-net grace period. Following the 2011
amendment to Japanese law, statistics show that large corporations
146
increased their share of applications invoking the grace period.
140. Where the disclosed invention in a provisional application cannot
adequately enable the described invention in a nonprovisional application, the
earlier filing date of the provisional application may be lost. Straus, supra note 1,
at 70. The utility requirement in Canadian patent law strictly enforces the
enablement of the earliest disclosure, effectively rendering certain pharmaceutical
technologies unpatentable. See Jay Erstling et al., Usefulness Varies by Country: The
Utility Requirement of Patent Law in the United States, Europe, and Canada, 3 CYBARIS
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 13–19 (2012).
141. Straus, supra note 1, at 69−70.
142. Id.
143. See Bardehle, supra note 73, at 1.
144. See Roucounas, supra note 4, at 32.
145. See Bardehle, supra note 73, at 1–2.
146. TEGERNSEE EXPERTS GRP., supra note 35, at 31.
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In Europe, the “evident abuse” standard of Article 55 equally
subjects large companies and SMEs to novelty destruction where
confidentiality agreements are breached by negligence or without
147
intent to harm.
And, while the legal certainty argument is
prevalent, movement can be registered among industry associations
representing various large corporations in Europe. At least
“unintentional disclosures” by an inventor have been conceded as
148
acceptable, and BusinessEurope (formerly UNICE) has voiced
itself in favor of a safety-net grace period where it cannot be used as
149
a “systemic practice.”
As with the switch to first-to-file in the
United States that primarily benefitted small and unsophisticated
150
applicants by simplifying the patent system, the concerns of large
European companies need to reasonably yield to the benefits
conferred to SMEs and university researchers by the introduction
of a safety-net grace period.
A.

Publishing Academia

Balancing the needs of large companies with those of
university research will realize several benefits. European university
researchers will be able to publish when absolutely necessary
without relinquishing their patent rights. University researchers
151
Publishing is vital to the professional
must “publish or perish.”
reputation of a researcher, and publishing first may be crucially
152
important.
With a safety-net grace period, researchers will have
147. See supra notes 75, 135 and accompanying text.
148. GALAMA, supra note 9, at 26.
149. Mike Barlow, UNICE, Address at Roundtable of NGOs: Patent
Law Harmonization: Is There a Way Forward? (Nov. 11, 2003),
available
at
http://www2.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Meetings_and
_Events1/International_Symposia1/UNICIE2.pdf. It can be inferred that the
systemic practice referred to is the ability to use the grace period as a strategic
patenting tool in claiming priority without risking loss of rights to intervening
disclosures. See also Walter Holzer, European Patent Institute (EPI), Address at
Roundtable of NGOs: Patent Law Harmonization: Is There a Way Forward? (Nov.
10, 2003), available at http://www2.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Meetings
_and_Events1/International_Symposia1/epi1.pdf (voicing support for a grace
period that cannot be taken “actively advantage of”).
150. See supra Part III.A.
151. See, e.g., The Controversial “Grace Period,” supra note 122.
152. Chiara Franzoni & Giuseppe Scellato, The Grace Period in International
Patent Law and Its Effect on the Timing of Disclosure, 39 RES. POL’Y 200, 203 (2010).
Enabling researchers to present their findings without the pressure to pursue
patenting immediately will “smooth[] the trade off between a quick disclosure to
the scientific community and the timings of a patent procedure.” Id.
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the opportunity to commercialize the research as well.
In one German study, 32.4 percent of university researchers
responded that because of the lack of a grace period they were
unable to pursue patent rights where they initially had planned to
153
do so.
Additionally, 54 percent found that the lack of a grace
154
period was a problem in their work.
To avoid loss of patent
rights, the advice to the academic community thus far has been to
155
The experiences in other countries
file first and publish later.
with grace periods, however, clearly prove that academic
156
publications and patent rights are not mutually exclusive.
Even more so, inventions resulting from university research
that utilize the grace period in the United States were found to be
published ten months prior to the application filing date in the
United States, whereas academic publications in Europe are not
made available to the public until sixteen months after the
157
application filing date.
Clearly, with a grace period the goal of
sharing inventions with the general public is then better
158
achieved.
B.

Small- and Medium-Sized Entities

European SMEs are also limited in their ability to succeed
under Article 55 of the European Patent Convention. SMEs are
159
often financially constrained and unsophisticated in patent law.
Therefore, SMEs often need time to evaluate, develop, and seek
funding for inventions before deciding whether to seek patent
160
rights.
Compared to large companies, SMEs by nature have fewer
resources available—whether human or financial—to develop
161
inventions and to patent them.
The result is that SMEs file
153. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR BILDUNG UND FORSCHUNG, ZUR EINFÜHRUNG DER
NEUHEITSSCHONFRIST IM PATENTRECHT – EIN USA-DEUTSCHLAND-VERGLEICH BEZOGEN
AUF DEN HOCHSCHULBEREICH 64 (2002) (Ger.) [hereinafter BUNDESMINISTERIUM].
154. Id. at 115.
155. See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 21; GERMAN PATENT BROCHURE, supra note 82,
at 19.
156. See Franzoni & Scellato, supra note 152, at 206.
157. Id.
158. Straus, supra note 1, at 73.
159. See MOY, supra note 4, § 8:605 n.7; Paul-Alexander Wacker, Milestones for
Improving the Protection of SME Innovations, IP VALUE 2012, Jan. 20, 2012, at 39.
160. See Gaétan de Rassenfosse, How SMEs Exploit Their Intellectual Property
Assets: Evidence from Survey Data, 39 SMALL BUS. ECON. 437, 447 (2012).
161. Id. at 449.
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patent applications on a smaller ratio of their inventions than large
162
companies. In turn, European SMEs also utilize a higher ratio of
the patents that they are granted when compared to large
163
companies.
This highly selective process used by SMEs to
determine which inventions to patent often depends on whether
the SME can acquire the necessary capital to commercialize the
164
invention and to acquire patent rights. Traditional bank lending
is not available for this purpose because European banks are
165
unwilling to accept intangible assets as collateral.
Risk-willing
166
capital must therefore be sought from venture-capital companies.
An unsophisticated European SME is then at risk if it does not
recognize that it must enter into a nondisclosure agreement with
the capital partner prior to disclosing the invention—whether
publicly or confidentially. Disclosing the invention to investors not
only helps the SMEs raise capital for commercially viable
inventions, it also saves the SMEs capital by not filing patent
applications for those inventions with limited or no commercial
167
potential.
In Japan, SMEs filed nearly four times as many
applications under the grace period following its expansion in
2011, and applications filed by joint applicants not including a
168
university more than doubled —clearly showing the benefits
private business can derive from a safety-net grace period.
Therefore, the absolute-novelty requirement of European
patent law disproportionately punishes SMEs who are
162. Marcus Holgersson, Patent Management in Entrepreneurial SMEs: A
Literature Review and an Empirical Study of Innovation Appropriation, Patent Propensity,
and Motives, R&D MGMT. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), available at http://
www.ip-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/PAM11-20120814a-with-publ
-info.pdf.
163. Rassenfosse, supra note 160, at 444. European SMEs utilize a higher ratio
of their patents—either through the SMEs’ own use or through licensing—
because the high cost of obtaining a patent forces SMEs to be selective in the
patents applied for. Id. The lower utilization ratio by larger companies is also
influenced by defensive patenting strategies in building patent portfolios with
“sleeping” patents. Id.
164. See id. at 447.
165. Id. at 441 (“[A] survey of about 50 European commercial banks found
none that routinely accept intangible assets as collateral for loans to new
technology-based firms.” (citing EUROPEAN COMM’N, FUNDING OF NEW TECHNOLOGY
BASED FIRMS BY COMMERCIAL BANKS IN EUROPE (2000))).
166. Holgersson, supra note 162, (manuscript at 10). The majority of the
SMEs surveyed by Holgersson stated that “patenting is crucial to attract venture
capital.” Id.
167. See Franzoni & Scellato, supra note 152, at 203.
168. TEGERNSEE EXPERTS GRP., supra note 35, at 31.
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unsophisticated in patent law, commercial transactions, or both.
Absolute novelty strips away any opportunity for SMEs to redeem
themselves from an ill-advised disclosure made in the process of
perfecting the invention or raising capital for its
commercialization. The anachronistic limitations of Article 55 of
the European Patent Convention therefore have the potential to
result in a knowledge loss to the SMEs and a financial loss to both
the SMEs and the European economy as a whole. It is no solution
169
to instruct SMEs to “file first and publish later.”
170
Ninety-nine percent of European companies are SMEs.
Patent law must be structured to at least take into account the
needs of the predominant business model. Further, European
SMEs suffer from conditions restricting their ability to grow that
171
are not present in the United States.
Labor laws often make it
difficult for SMEs to hire new employees because they may not be
172
terminated easily.
In addition, bankruptcy laws often do not
discharge the borrower for several years—if ever—causing SMEs to
173
be less risk tolerant.
Given these barriers to economic growth, unnecessary patentlaw limitations should not hold back economic activity by European
SMEs any further. At a minimum, a safety-net grace period would
afford SMEs the opportunity to raise capital without risking the
intangible asset attracting the investment, potentially resulting in
economic growth from a commercialized invention.

169. See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 21; GERMAN PATENT BROCHURE, supra note
82, at 19.
170. Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs): Facts and Figures About the EU’s
Small and Medium Enterprise (SME), EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu
/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2013).
171. See, e.g., European Entrepreneurs: Les Misérables, ECONOMIST, July 28, 2012,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21559618.
172. Id.
173. PAUL WYMENGA ET AL., ARE EU SMES RECOVERING? ANNUAL REPORT ON EU
SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES 2010/2011 35–36 (2011), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/performance-review
/files/supporting-documents/2010-2011/annual-report_en.pdf.
Most entrepreneurs are not willing to start-up their own company if they
know in advance that they would not be given a second chance. If given
the chance, failed entrepreneurs do learn from their mistakes and are
generally more successful the second time round creating more jobs and
a higher turnover than first[-time entrepreneurs].
Id. at 36 (footnotes omitted); see also European Entrepreneurs: Les Misérables, supra
note 171.
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General Public
174

Patents are often compared to strong monopolies. They are
too powerful to be granted to subject matter or inventions already
175
publicly known.
The monopoly is granted in return for public
access to the disclosure of the invention—benefitting development
176
A limited protection for prefiling
of future inventions.
disclosures, only granted to the inventor or his successor in title
therefore does not controvert the exchange of a monopoly in
return for public access to the invention. To the contrary, it grants
the public access to the invention sooner, facilitating the process of
new inventions drawing use from the disclosure at an even earlier
177
stage.
Article 55 of the European Patent Convention, however, limits
the benefits that can be drawn from university research and SME
ingenuity. The public funds university research through taxes. It
follows that restricting the ability to commercialize technology
resulting from the taxpayer-funded research also limits the public’s
178
return on investment.
For example, the application for the
“Cohen/Boyer Patent” filed under the United States grace period
generated more than $200 million in revenue for the University of
179
California and Stanford University.
Further, there is no public policy gain in harshly penalizing
SMEs in their effort to create new products, new jobs, and
economic growth. Novelty destruction is an absurd outcome,
especially where “a single non-confidential disclosure can represent
prior art even if persons skilled in the art have no capability of
180
reasonably or effectively accessing that disclosure.”
The public benefits of a limited grace period have been
174. GALAMA, supra note 9, at 13; Straus, supra note 1, at 46–47.
175. See ARMITAGE, supra note 9, at 1 (“Inventors are never entitled to take
from the public subject matter that deemed [sic] already known or merely obvious
from what is deemed to be known.”).
176. See MOY, supra note 4, § 7:2; Straus, supra note 1, at 73.
177. Straus, supra note 1, at 73; Franzoni & Scellato, supra note 152, at 201
(finding evidence that U.S. inventions appear in open science journals earlier
than European inventions even where the applications were not filed under the
United States grace period).
178. See Joseph Straus, Intellectual Property and Science: A Complex Partnership, in
ALLEA BIENNIAL Y.B. 2004 19, 25 (Pieter J.D. Drenth & Johannes J.F. Schroots eds.,
2004), available at http://www.allea.org/Content/ALLEA/Themes/IPR/Straus
_IPR_Complex_Partnership.pdf.
179. Straus, supra note 1, at 69.
180. ARMITAGE, supra note 9, at 5.
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noticed. The German Patent Office, a German government
advisory council, and German parliament members have all
endorsed the notion of a grace period to permit prefiling
disclosures by university researchers and inventors seeking to
181
commercialize their inventions.
VI. BEST-PRACTICE MODEL SAFETY-NET GRACE PERIOD
AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
Previous efforts at creating a harmonized grace period have
182
There are too many stakeholders internationally—with
failed.
interests too diverse—to reasonably believe that substantive patentlaw harmonization is attainable among all World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) member countries. Instead, the
major offices can and should agree to best practices that can be
adopted by willing national offices.
A.

Model Grace Period

As a best practice, the safety-net grace period must take into
account the interests of all users of the patent system—to the
degree that it is possible. As explained above, legal uncertainty and
alleged possible detrimental reliance on a grace period are not
valid arguments to exclude the publishing academia, individual
183
inventors, and SMEs.
Because legal uncertainty is a nonfactor,
the most effective grace period would be twelve months and would
protect all acts deemed to be a disclosure—similar to the grace
184
periods in the United States, Japan, and Korea. There should be
no reason to limit a grace period from evolving with technology
and society by attempting to predict how disclosures will be made
in the future.
The grace period in turn must be limited in the subject matter
that it protects to promote its use as a safety net only and preserve
the true nature of a first-to-file system. This solution appropriately
balances the concern of larger users in determining what
constitutes prior art, while protecting academic publications and
181. DEUTHSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT] 17/1052,
at 2; BUNDESMINISTERIUM, supra note 153, at 116; EXPERTENKOMMISSION FORSCHUNG
UND INNOVATION, RESEARCH, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE IN
GERMANY: 2009 REPORT, 42–43 (2009).
182. See supra Part III.D.
183. See supra Part IV.
184. See supra Parts III.A, B.2–3.
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unsophisticated
applicants
from
being
harshly
and
185
disproportionately punished with a total loss of rights.
Equally important to protect the rights of unsophisticated
applicants, a grace period should not require a formal requirement
to invoke the grace period at the time the application is filed. This
corresponds with the safety-net grace period’s purpose to
accommodate unsophisticated applicants.
Unsophisticated
applicants may not be aware of the requirement and should not be
punished for their lack of knowledge. If a patent office later
questions the invention’s novelty, the burden should be on the
applicant to prove his right.
B.

Implementation

With the enactment of the AIA, the USPTO has been able to
reengage the major international patent offices in talks regarding
186
substantive patent law. The United States, however, cannot force
harmonization of substantive patent law on other patent offices.
The member countries of the European Patent Convention must
take it upon themselves to amend Article 55 and adopt a safety-net
grace period as a best practice. In switching to first-to-file, the
United States clearly demonstrated how best practices can be
adopted to make patent systems easier to use—for both domestic
and foreign applicants—by reducing legal uncertainty caused by
the ability of a third party to establish an earlier invention date.
Amending Article 55 of the European Patent Convention will
similarly simplify international patent law and substantially benefit
its member states’ applicants. The EPO—“stimulated” by not being

185. In this regard, the United States unilaterally adopted the safety-net grace
period as a best practice by switching to first-to-file and limiting the subject-matter
protection of the grace period under section 102 (b). See supra Part III.A.2.
186. Oversight over the United States Patent and Trademark Office: Implementation of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and International Harmonization Efforts: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3–4 (2012) (statement of David
Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office) (“Passage of the AIA has
provided an opportunity to restart long-stalled discussions with our foreign
counterparts toward substantive harmonization”), available at http://www
.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-6-20KapposTestimony.pdf; see Benoît Battistelli, The
Road to Patent Law Harmonisation, EUR. PAT. OFF. (July 12, 2011), http://blog.epo
.org/patents/the-road-to-patent-law-harmonisation/ (“[T]he impressive legislative
activity recently seen in the [United States], which should be completed next
autumn, has given the process a new boost.”).
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187

invited to the Asia-Pacific Forum in March 2011 —appears to
understand the seriousness of the commitment by the other major
offices to pursue harmonization through best practices. The EPO
followed quickly in July 2011 by hosting the heads of the national
offices of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan,
188
and Denmark.
Known as the Tegernsee Group, these offices
have decided to focus on substantive harmonization of four areas,
189
including the grace period. The Tegernsee Group is therefore a
favorable vehicle to agree on the grace period as an international
190
best practice.
And, while the Tegernsee Group has wisely developed its
191
program in detail prior to seeking industry input,
the
abandonment of a general grace period should further eliminate
the concerns of European industry. It is quite clear that German
192
lawmakers prefer a grace period, and with the previous Danish
193
and French support of a safety-net grace period, they must be
considered to be in favor of the adoption of a grace period under
194
the European Patent Convention as well.
Amending Article 55 of the European Patent Convention to
include a safety-net grace period will be of sufficient strategic
importance to encourage remaining national offices around the
187.

ON
HARMONIZATION
DISCUSSION
(2012), available at http://www
.aipla.org/resources/intlip/Documents/Other-International-Events/US-Bar-JPO
-Liaison-Council-2012/Update-on-Harmonization-Discussion-from-JPO-Perspective
.pdf.
188. Battistelli, supra note 186.
189. Heads of Office Discuss Patent Law Harmonisation, EUR. PAT. OFF. (Apr. 25,
2012), http://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2012/20120425.html. The four
areas of substantive patent law harmonization focused on are a grace period,
eighteen-month publication, prior art effect of secret prior art, and prior user
rights. Id.
190. The Tegernsee group will be unencumbered by the diverse agendas of
the national offices previously participating in WIPO negotiations on substantive
patent law harmonization.
191. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, WIPO ASSEMBLIES 2012 REPORT 5
(2012), available at http://www.aipla.org/resources/intlip/Documents/Other
-International-Events/WIPO%20Assemblies%20Report%202012.pdf.
192. DEUTHSCHER BUNDESTAG, supra note 181.
193. See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 10; Straus, supra note 1, at 11.
194. The momentum of harmonization in terms of best practices is further
advanced by the proactive role of the JPO under the auspices of the IP5. The
JPO—already having facilitated the tremendously successful Patent-Prosecution
Highway system—has not let up on its international counterparts to reduce
inefficiencies caused by the lack of best practices for a grace period. See SAWAI,
supra note 187, at 5–7.
FROM

TOMOKI
SAWAI,
UPDATE
JPO’S PERSPECTIVE 5
THE
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world to follow this best practice. The safety-net grace period as a
best practice, adopted by the United States, Europe, Japan, Korea,
and hopefully China—in addition to the other sixty-eight countries
already with some type of grace period—effectively will provide
unsophisticated applicants the opportunity to internationally
exploit the commercial value of their inventions when a prefiling
disclosure occurred.
VII. CONCLUSION
The European allegiance to absolute novelty has so far been
unyielding to the legitimate needs of applicants who disclose
unintentionally or cannot refrain from making a prefiling
disclosure. The complete destruction of novelty is a harsh and
disproportionate result. It is an outcome that unnecessarily
penalizes inventors and unsophisticated users and is contrary to the
basic bargain that inventors will be rewarded with a patent for
195
disclosing a novel invention.
Novelty destruction unduly favors
large sophisticated applicants who benefit from free access to
inventions that, with a grace period, would be exploited by the
“original” inventors—applicants that ultimately may be more likely
to put the patented invention into actual commercial use in
196
Europe.
As demonstrated in this note, a limited safety-net grace period
that protects against otherwise novelty-destroying disclosures is a
best practice. It effectively protects the interests of unsophisticated
inventors and applicants without harming the legal rights of third
parties. No quid pro quo is required, but European leaders should
take notice of the American willingness to create international best
practices. Thirty years have already been wasted by the attempts to
achieve a grand bargain. Unilaterally adopting a safety-net grace
period as a best practice to harmonize with the other major offices
can be achieved without such delay.

195. See GERMAN PATENT BROCHURE, supra note 82, at 4 (stating that patentable
rights are the reward to inventors for disclosing information); Bardehle, supra
note 41, at 107–08.
196. See supra Part V.B.
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